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Abstract 
 
A dominant theme in the debate on road pricing reform is securing buy in from all key 
stakeholders as a pre-condition for gaining support from politicians. This paper 
explores the key influences and the extent to which particular road pricing schemes 
are acceptable to the community at large, and how this translates into support if a 
scheme were subject to a vote in a referendum. Using data collected in Sydney in 
2012 from a sample of car users, we estimate a recursive simultaneous bivariate probit 
model that recognises the endogeneity effect of scheme acceptability on voting plans. 
We find that there is a very strong link between voting intentions and scheme 
acceptability, and provide a series of direct elasticity estimates of the influence that 
the cost elements of road pricing reform schemes have on the joint probability of 
accepting and voting for a scheme. 
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Introduction 
 
Roads are possibly the most underpriced of all the public assets in terms of efficient 
user contributions. Regardless of whether some believe that governments should 
provide more (under-priced) road capacity to combat traffic congestion, it is an 
undeniable fact that if we provide more capacity under the existing road user pricing 
regimes and levels, more cars will use the roads, quickly using up any additional 
available capacity. The great sadness about all of this is that there is a presumption 
that we all have rights to enter the traffic and delay all other motorists, yet not fully 
pay for the true cost associated with delay and lost time – the curse of congestion. The 
future of public transport is also linked to this tragedy of the commons, if one believes 
in the adage that ‘to make public transport more attractive we have to make the car 
less attractive, and that no amount of public transport investment that we can afford 
will solve road congestion’.  
 
We need road pricing reform, much touted by economists and others who see the 
current charging instruments inadequate in both delivering efficient outcomes for road 
use as well as raising sufficient revenue to fund new infrastructure and much needed 
maintenance of existing road networks. What do we mean by road pricing? It 
comprises all sources of outlay by users (fixed charges such as annual registration fee, 
fuel costs (including excise), tolls, and negative externality costs). Crucially, road 
pricing reform is not a matter of simply adding a congestion charge on top of existing 
charges. That is what has got the whole reform process in an action stalemate. It 
requires wholesale reform of all elements of user costs including all fixed charges 
such as registration fees (see Hensher and Bliemer 2012, Hensher and Mulley 2012), 
although we recognise that while this is an appealing reform position, it is no 
guarantee of public acceptability. 
 
However introducing road pricing reform is a delicate task as there are many interests 
at stake. In general, travellers would like to have a fair system and typically do not 
like paying more than they currently do. Public acceptability is often regarded as a 
prerequisite for introducing road pricing. If the public acceptability is not there, 
politicians typically find the topic too controversial. 
 
There are a number of ways to move forward in the reform process, including a trial 
as in Stockholm, and a referendum either to support a trial or to vote for the outcomes 
of the trial (as in Stockholm). A referendum in Sydney has been suggested from time 
to time to gauge the measure of support for such major reform, and hence the interest 
we have in establishing the extent to which there might be a positive outcome in such 
a vote for specific reform measures. To investigate the relationship between public 
acceptability and support through a referendum for a specific road pricing reform 
scheme, the next section introduces a choice modelling framework that represents the 
interdependent choice response equations. As far as we are aware, no previous studies 
account for the potential endogeneity1 of road pricing scheme acceptability on voting 
in a formal econometric model framework2. We then describe the data context, the 
survey instrument and key descriptive statistics. We then present the model estimates, 
                                                            
1 See a later section for more details on the definition of endogeneity and a test to establish its presence. 
2 Arendt and Holm (2007) investigate the relationship between trust and voting in a health context 
using a similar method. 
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associated direct elasticities and scenarios that achieve greater than 50 percent support 
in a referendum, and discuss the findings, showing that taking endogeneity into 
account has relevant consequences for the estimated effect of acceptability on voting. 
The conclusions summarise the key contributions. This paper does not focus on the 
political economy of how best to sell the various road pricing reforms schemes; there 
is a growing literature on this topic (e.g. Jones et al. 1998, Schade and Schlag 2003), 
with Hensher focussing on this topic in Hensher and Bliemer (2012) and Hensher and 
Mulley (2012). 
 
Model Formulation of the Ex Ante Link between Acceptability and 
Voting Intentions for a Road Pricing Scheme 
 
The model proposed in this paper is motivated by the idea that models in which latent 
variables occur simultaneously such as perceived acceptability of a road pricing (RP) 
scheme and voting intention, as defined by dichotomous responses in which the 
referendum vote is not an actual (ex post) realisation but an ex ante intention, are 
often referred to as recursive or sequential models (Maddala 1983). Given the two 
binary settings (y1, y2), namely an intention to vote yes in a referendum (1) or 
otherwise (0) for an RP scheme (referred to as y1 = Vote) and acceptance of an RP 
scheme (1) or not (0) (referred to as y2 = Accept), we can define the basic model 
formulation as a bivariate probit model, given in equation system (1), 
 
  yi1* = 1xi1 + i1,  yi1  =  1 if yi1* > 0, yi1  =  0 otherwise, 
  yi2* = 2xi2 + i2,  yi2  =  1 if yi2* > 0, yi2  =  0 otherwise,  (1) 
  [i1,i2] ~ N2 [0,0,1,1,], -1 <  < 1, 
 
where individual observations on y1 and y2 are available for all i individuals. xi1 and xi2 
are the regressor vectors of exogenous influences for individual i, and i is a vector of 
unknown coefficients to be estimated. yij* (j=1,2) is an unobserved variable 
representing the latent utility or propensity of choosing to Accept (or Vote) for a 
specific RP scheme.  measures the correlation between the normally distributed 
disturbances (i1,i2) in the equations or the omitted variables after the included 
influences are accounted for. Given that the two choice responses are binary,  cannot 
be defined by the familiar Pearson product moment correlation as used for continuous 
variables; instead the tetrachoric correlation3 is used as the appropriate measure of the 
correlation between two binary variables.   
 
Let us consider the model for the probability of the event y1 = 0/1 and y2 = 0/1 
assuming the constant 2 = 0 (for y2 = 0) for identification, as given in equation 
system (2). 
 
   Prob[y1 = 1, y2 = 1 | x1 , x2 ]  =  2 (1x1 + 1,  2x2, ) 
   Prob[y1 = 1, y2 = 0 | x1 , x2 ]  =  2 (1x1,        -2x2, -) 
   Prob[y1 = 0, y2 = 1 | x1 , x2 ]  =  2 (-1x1 + 1, 2x2, -)  (2) 
                                                            
3 The tetrachoric correlation is used when it is assumed that there are latent continuous variables 
underlying the observed binary variables. The tetrachoric correlation estimates the correlation between 
the assumed underlying continuous variables. 
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   Prob[y1 = 0, y2 = 0 | x1 , x2 ]  =  2 (-1x1,       -2x2, ) 
 
This is a simultaneous equations model. It can be estimated by full information 
maximum likelihood ignoring the simultaneity in the system. A proof of this result is 
suggested in Maddala (1983, p. 123) and in Greene (1998). The conditional mean for 
y1 is given in equation (3). 
 
   E[y1 | y2 = 1, x1, x2]  =  2 (1x1 +  1, 2x2, ) / (2x2)  (3) 
 
The unconditional mean function is given as equation (4). 
 
E[y1 | x1, x2] =  (2x2) E[y1 | y2 = 1, x1, x2]  + [1-(2x2)] E[y1 | y2 = 0, x1, x2] 
    =  2 (1x1 +  1, 2x2, )  + 2 (1x1, -2x2, -) (4) 
 
Given the form of this result, we can identify direct effects in the conditional mean: 
 
  1 2 1 2 1 1
1 2
[ | 1, , ]
( ' )
E y y g   
x x
x x
   = direct effects   (5) 
   
 
To define the log likelihood function (LLF), let qim = 2yim - 1, m = 1,2.  The LLF for 
the bivariate probit model is defined by equation (6) where 2 denotes the bivariate 
standard normal cumulative density function (CDF). 
 
   log L  =  i log 2[qi11xi1, qi22xi2, qi1qi2]   (6) 
 
Define 2[.,.,.] as the bivariate normal density function, with  and  denoting the 
univariate standard normal density and CDF, respectively.  For convenience, we can 
drop the observation subscript.  Let zm  =  mxm, m = 1,2; wm =  qm zm, m = 1,2; * =  
q1q2  (note that the sign is the same if y1 = y2); g1  = (w1)[(w2 - *w1)/(1 - *2)1/2 ]; 
and g2 =  (w2)[(w1 - *w2)/(1 - *2)1/2]. Then, log L/j = i (qj gj/2)xj ,  j = 1,2 
and log L/  = i q1q2 2 /2. 
 
A recursive simultaneous equation system is qualitatively different from the bivariate 
probit model above in that it allows for the binary response from the second equation 
(Accept) to appear on the right-hand side of the first equation (Vote), but in a setting 
where the variables are likely to be spuriously related due to observed as well as 
unobserved independent variables (see Arendt and Holm 2007). This additional 
dimension is one of three reasons why we might observe y1 and y2 to be correlated: (i) a 
causal relation due to the influence of y2 on y1 through the parameter1, (ii) y2 and y1 may 
depend on correlated observed variables (the x’s) and (iii) y2 and y1 may depend on 
correlated unobserved variables (the i’s). 
 
The endogenous nature of Accept is explicitly accounted for in the formulation of the 
log-likelihood, as in equation (6), a finding demonstrated by Maddala (1983, 124). 
Greene (1998) provides a nice explanation of this point. The log-likelihood is expressed 
in terms of Prob (Vote =1, Accept =1) = Prob (Vote =1 |Accept = 1)*Prob (Accept =1). 
Given the model form as proposed initially by Burnett (1997), namely: 
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Prob[Vote= 1, Accept = 1 | x1 , x2 ]  =  2 (1x1 + 1Accept,  2x2, ),  (7) 
 
the marginal probability for Accept =1 is (2x2), and the conditional probability for 
(Vote =1 |Accept = 1) is 2 (1x1 + 1Accept, 2x2,)/(2x2).  The equivalent log-
likelihood for the other three equations, resulting in four probability expressions 
(equation 7 and equations 8a-c), is: 
 
Prob[Vote= 1, Accept = 0 | x1 , x2 ]  =  2 (1x1,  -2x2, -)    (8a) 
Prob[Vote= 0, Accept = 1 | x1 , x2 ]  =  2 (-(1x1 + 1Accept),  2x2, -)  (8b) 
Prob[Vote= 0, Accept = 0 | x1 , x2 ]  =  2 (-1x1,  -2x2, )    (8c) 
 
Because the appearance of Accept only occurs when it is equal to 1, this is equivalent 
to 1 and 1 in equation system (1). Hence we can ignore the simultaneity in this model 
under maximisation of the log-likelihood4. In the empirical modelling, we estimate 
system (7-8), and contrast it with a model in which we have no endogenous right hand 
variable, allowing in both models for correlated responses. 
The Road Pricing Data Collection Approach 
 
The survey instrument was a computer assisted personal interview (CAPI), resident 
on the Institute of Transport and Logistics Studies server, accessed via laptops used 
by interviewers who sat with the respondents, at locations made through 
appointments, to provide any advice that was required in working through the survey, 
while not offering answers to any of the questions.  
 
The data used in the models is extracted from a stated choice experiment that 
consisted of three alternatives; two labelled alternatives representing a cordon-based 
charging scheme and a distance-based charging scheme, randomly assigned to road 
pricing schemes 1 and 2, and the status quo. Each alternative was described by 
separate attributes representing the average amount of tolls and fuel outlaid weekly, 
the annual vehicle registration charge and the allocation of revenues raised to improve 
public transport, improve and expand upon the existing road network, to reduce 
income tax, to contribute to general government revenue and to be used to 
compensate toll road companies for loss of toll revenue. The cordon-based charging 
scheme and a distance-based alternative were also described by either a peak and off 
peak cordon-based charging amount or a peak or off peak per kilometre distance-
based charge. Both non-status quo alternatives were also described by the year 
proposed that the scheme would commence. 
 
A Bayesian D-efficient experimental design was implemented for the study (see Rose 
et al. 2008). The design was generated in such a way that the cost-related attribute 
levels for the status quo were first acquired from respondents during preliminary 
questions in the survey, whilst associated attributes for the cordon-based and distance-
based charging schemes were pivoted off of these as minus percentage shifts 
representing a reduction in such costs for these schemes. Pivoted attributes included 
                                                            
4 This result does not hold for a linear regression form where we would be manipulating certain sample 
moments that do not converge to the necessary population parameters in the presence of simultaneity 
(see Greene (1998) for further details). 
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average fuel costs and annual registration fees. Fuel costs were reduced by anywhere 
between zero percent and 50 percent of the respondent reported values, either 
representing no reduction in fuel tax or up to a potential 100 percent reduction in fuel 
taxes. Registration fees were reduced to between zero percent and 100 percent from 
the respondent-reported values (see Rose et al. 2008 for a description of pivot type 
designs). Toll was only included in the status quo alternative, being set to zero for the 
non status quo alternatives since it is replaced by the road pricing regime5.  
 
The allocation of revenues raised were fixed for the status quo alternative, but varied 
in the cordon-based and distance-based charging schemes over choice tasks. The 
allocation of revenue was varied from zero percent to 100 percent for a given revenue 
stream category. Within a charging scheme, the allocation of revenue was such that 
the sum had to equal 100 percent across all possible revenue allocations.  
 
The cordon-based charging alternative was described by a peak and off peak cordon 
charge. The peak charge varied between $2.00 and $20.00, whilst the off peak charge 
was varied between $0.00 and $15.00. Likewise, the distance-based charge was 
described by two distance-based charging attributes, one for trips taken during peak 
periods and the second for off-peak trips. The per kilometre charge for the peak 
period ranged from $0.05 per kilometre to $0.40 per kilometre, whilst the off peak 
distance-based charge varied between $0.00 and $0.30 per kilometre. The ranges 
selected were based on ranges that we believe would contain the most likely levels if 
implemented. The design was generated in such a way that the peak cordon-based, 
and peak per kilometre based, charges were always equal to or greater than the 
associated off peak charges. Finally, the cordon-based and distance-based charging 
schemes were described by the year the scheme would be implemented.  In each case, 
this was varied between 2013 (representing one year from the survey) and 2016 
(representing a four year delay from the time of the survey). 
 
The attributes and the relevant attribute levels for all alternatives are shown in Table 
16. The range for each attribute was investigated through in depth and pilot interviews 
to ensure coverage in the context of elicitation of behavioural preferences and public 
acceptability, extending this range in the final design to allow for the possibility of not 
accommodating some range coverage that may be relevant in a larger sample. Priors 
for the design were obtained from a pilot study consisting of nine respondents 
collected prior to the main field phase which was also designed to test the preliminary 
survey instrument. The final design consisted of 60 choice tasks which were blocked 
into 15 blocks of four choice tasks each. The blocking was accomplished by using an 
                                                            
5 The context here is one where tolls already exist, which might be replaced by a (more flexible) road 
pricing scheme. This context differs a lot from countries (i.e., several countries in Europe) that do not 
have tolls on a major scale, and where the issue is to introduce a form of road pricing that will not be 
replacing tolls. Getting support might then be more difficult. 
6 Travel time impacts are not included in the choice experiment. We laboured over it for many hours, 
recognising that this is almost impossible to identify without integrating the experiment into a network 
model that can capture the net time savings associated with the full set of responses from all motorists. 
We decided that it would be best to recognise that motorists would internalise their expectations of 
time savings based on their contextual experience, but we recognise that a worthy extension of our 
work is to combine the effort to date with some traffic simulation capability. In mid 2013, we 
established TRAvel Choice Simulation LABoratory (TRACSLab), a visualisation laboratory to study 
travel behaviour and drivers' interactions".  
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algorithm designed to minimise the maximum absolute correlation between the design 
attributes and the blocking column. 
 
The overall choice experiment might be seen by some researchers as complex. The 
approach is informed by the many studies undertaken by the author in which the   idea 
of relevance is paramount, provided one can deliver a comprehensive and 
comprehendable choice experiment. There is growing support for the relevancy 
argument since the case was detailed in Hensher (2006). In the current study, we 
undertook the most extensive piloting on the survey instrument and used four of the 
most experienced interviewers who have worked on all our stated choice studies. We 
took over six months with repeated testing to ensure that respondents understood the 
design and documented all their feedback as the instrument was revised numerous 
times. 
Table 1 The Choice experiment Attribute Levels and Range 
Note: the cordon‐based and distance based charges are not pivoted off of the status quo levels 
Attribute Status quo Cordon-based scheme Distance-based scheme 
Year scheme introduced - 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016 
Average fuel cost per week User reported level 
0%, -10%, -20%,  
-30%, -40%, -50% 
0%, -10%, -20%,  
-30%, -40%, -50% 
Average toll cost per week User reported level $0.00 $0.00 
Annual vehicle registration User reported level 
0%, -25%, -50%,  
-75%, -100% 
0%, -25%, -50%,  
-75%, -100% 
Peak cordon-based charge (per trip) $0.00 $2.00, $6.50, $11.00,  $15.50, $20.00 - 
Off peak cordon-based charge (per trip) $0.00 $0.00, $3.00, $6.00,  $9.00, $12.00, $15.00 - 
Peak distance-based charge (per km) $0.00 - $0.05, $0.12, $0.19,  $0.26, $0.33, $0.40 
Off peak distance-based charge (per km) $0.00 - $0.00, $0.06, $0.12,  $0.18, $0.24, $0.30 
% of funds allocated to public transport 0% 0%, 20%, 40%,  60%, 80%, 100% 
0%, 20%, 40%,  
60%, 80%, 100% 
% of funds allocated to road infrastructure 30% 0%, 20%, 40%,  60%, 80%, 100% 
0%, 20%, 40%,  
60%, 80%, 100% 
% of funds allocated to reducing tax 0% 0%, 20%, 40%,  60%, 80%, 100% 
0%, 20%, 40%,  
60%, 80%, 100% 
% of funds allocated to general revenue 65% 0%, 20%, 40%,  60%, 80%, 100% 
0%, 20%, 40%,  
60%, 80%, 100% 
% of funds allocated to private (toll) firms 5% 0%, 20%, 40%,  60%, 80%, 100% 
0%, 20%, 40%,  
60%, 80%, 100% 
Note: Table 1 shows the levels of the peak and off peak cordon and distance-based charges. They 
cannot be pivoted for obvious reasons (they do not yet exist), but the ranges were selected in line with 
what we believe is the range under which an actual scheme would be implemented. There are many 
combinations of these charges within the choice experiment together with the pivoted levels of each 
cost attribute and there is a wide range of new costs and net savings. We have provided the total cost 
(all cost outlays) per week (mean and standard deviation) in Table 2 for status quo and each of cordon-
based and distance-based charging schemes to show the profile. 
 
The example of a choice screen is presented in Figure 1 with the boundaries of the 
proposed cordon-based charge area shown in Figure 2. Respondents were asked a 
number of response questions, including which alternative they most preferred. In 
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addition, they were asked whether they would vote for each RP scheme if it were 
subject to a referendum, and whether each RP scheme was acceptable7.  
 
 
 
Figure 1 Illustrative Voting and Acceptance Choice Screen 
 
 
Figure 2 The location of the Cordon-Charge Area 
 
Respondents had to be of voting age 8 . The main survey of 200 residents was 
undertaken in April 2012 in the Sydney Metropolitan Area. The sample includes 
residents of the entire Sydney metropolitan area which includes the area of the 
cordon, although there are relatively few residents in the cordon area which is 
primarily business and retail. A descriptive profile of the key data items is given in 
Tables 2a and 2b for the full sample. The average number of trips per week passing 
                                                            
7 The status quo is the fall back alternative, analogous to choosing none of the new alternatives on 
offer. That is, we defined the status quo as the null since it is what respondents do now, and it is not 
unreasonable to assume that this would be a valid null. 
8 The socioeconomic profile, at the mean is representative of the wider population of car drivers in 
Sydney. The average age of car drivers and their personal incomes is almost identical to the 2011 
census average. 
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through the cordon area is 1.85 with a standard deviation of 3.47 and a range from 
zero to 18. Interviews took, on average, 46.2 minutes but were as short as 12.37 
minutes, and as long as 88.5 minutes. Respondents were given $50 to compensate for 
their time and any out of pocket travel expenses. With the well trained interviewer 
present9, we observed no evidence of fatigue, also in part because the topic was of 
great interest (see Hess et al., (2012) who provide strong evidence that the concerns 
about fatigue in the literature are possibly overstated, with no clear decreasing trend in 
scale across choice tasks in four studies in different countries). 
 
Table 2a Descriptive Profile of the Sample10 
(All cost items are in $AUD 2012) 
Status Quo Variables Mean Std deviation Min Max 
Total cost (per week) (i.e., fuel, tolls, and average weekly 
registration fee)  
66.86 45.76 0 261.5 
Fuel cost (per week) 46.12 34.99 0 200 
Tolls per week 7.67 14.63 0 100 
Vehicle Registration per annum 679.65 464.99 0 3200 
Voting response for alternative voted for if a referendum on road 
pricing (%) 
19.6  0 100 
     
Cordon Road Pricing Scheme Variables Mean Std deviation Min Max 
Total cost (per week) 48.46 36.69 0 243.9 
Fuel cost (per week) 34.46 27.25 0 180 
Tolls per week 0 0 0 0 
Vehicle Registration per annum 339.9 377.38 0 3200 
Peak charge (7-9am, 4-6pm) $ per entry 11.05 6.37 2 20 
Off peak charge $ per entry 5.83 4.50 0 15 
Cordon charges per week 7.47 17.05 0 132 
Peak period weekly cordon cost outlay 3.58 9.75 0 83.5 
Off peak period weekly cordon cost outlay 3.89 9.58 0 84.1 
Voting and acceptability response for each Cordon based alternative      
Would the alternative be voted for if a referendum on road pricing 
(%) 
49.6  0 100 
Road pricing scheme is acceptable (%) 76.4  0 1 
Revenue allocated to public transport (%) 21.18 27.53 0 100 
Revenue allocated to existing and construct roads (%) 18.38 26.49 0 100 
Revenue allocated to reduce personal income tax (%) 20.85 26.29 0 100 
Revenue allocated to private toll road company (%) 18.95 29.22 0 100 
Revenue allocated to general govt revenue (%) 20.65 27.63 0 100 
Effective in reducing traffic congestion 0.274 0.334 0 1 
Distance-Based Road Pricing Scheme Variables Mean Std deviation Min Max 
Total cost (per week) 71.01 58.44 0 446 
Fuel cost (per week) 34.62 28.65 0 200 
Tolls per week 0 0 0 0 
Vehicle Registration per annum 342.4 374.2 0 3200 
                                                            
9 Interviewer effects in the responses are always a possibility and need to be checked carefully. When 
we train highly specialised interviewers, they know that they must not interfere with the choice making 
process. The biggest concern in the past has been incompetent interviewers (many studies have a few 
of these), and in the current data collection exercise we worked with four highly trained interviewers 
for over six months of in depth and pilot activities to get the instrument to a level that it was relevant, 
comprehensive and comprehendable. We could not find any systematic sources of bias across the 
interviewers (tested by adding interviewer-specific dummy variables). 
10 A refer commented “that it appears that average costs incurred for the cordon charge were much 
lower than for the  DB charging – so is it possible to tell how much support for the former is on the 
basis of the relative cost saving or the principle of a simpler scheme that is easy to understand?” This is 
not the case in general since it depends on the kilometres travelled. Also it is not meaningful to 
compare the cordon and distance-based charges directly given one focuses on the CBD only and the 
other is system wide, and this distinction is important. Figure 1 is an example choice screen of a higher 
DB charge that the CB charge, and indeed the relativities vary throughout the choice experiment 
design. Because of the spatial differences, it makes no sense to standardise on the same levels of 
charges when one is a block charge in the CBD, and other clearly varies throughout the Sydney metro 
and is dependent on kilometres travelled. Some of the charging levels are lower for DB than CB 
charging. 
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Peak charge (7-9am, 4-6pm) $ per week given weekly kilometres 15.12 22.01 0 160 
Off peak charge $ per week given weekly kilometres 14.68 25.26 0 234 
Peak period Distance-based cost per km ($/km) 0.225 0.120 0.05 0.40 
Off peak period Distance-based cost per km ($/km) 0.101 0.097 0 0.3 
Voting and acceptability response for each alternative distance-
based alternative (%) 
30.6  0 100 
Alternative voted for if a referendum on road pricing (%) 30.6  0 1 
Road pricing scheme is acceptable (%) 55.9    
Revenue allocated to public transport (%) 21.1 30.5 0 100 
Revenue allocated to existing and construct roads (%) 18.6 27.2 0 100 
Revenue allocated to reduce personal income tax (%) 22.5 28.4 0 100 
Revenue allocated to private toll road company (%) 20.5 26.9 0 100 
Revenue allocated to general govt revenue (%) 17.3 26.48 0 100 
Effective in reducing traffic congestion 0.495 0.296 0 1 
 
 
Table 2b Descriptive Profile of Sample 
See Appendix for survey screenshots of the questions asked 
Note: The profile refers to all trip purposes 
 
Other Descriptive Data: Mean Std deviation Min Max
Peak kilometres per week 70.68 88.58 0 400 
Off Peak kilometres per week 145.9 143.6 0 977.5 
Proportion of weekly kilometres in peak 0.297 0.269 0 0.99 
Weekly hours travelling by car and motorbike 7.60 6.68 0 50 
Weekly CBD trips 1.85 3.48 0 18 
Preferred revenue allocated to public transport (%) 38.86 18.50 0 100 
Preferred revenue to existing and construct roads (%) 32.03 14.44 0 70 
Preferred revenue to reduce personal income tax (%) 16.06 16.83 0 100 
Preferred revenue to private toll road company (%) 6.20 8.11 0 50 
Preferred revenue to general govt revenue (%) 6.86 8.41 0 30 
Extent of awareness of what road pricing means (%) 38.03 29.24 0 100 
How familiar are you with the debate on road pricing (%) 22.63 27.09 0 100 
Confidence in public sector allocating revenue as you indicated (%) 22.32  0 100 
Would support a road pricing trial (%) 91.8  0 100 
Cents per km to switch from peak travel if price selected (84% 
sample) 
9.06 5.02 2 15 
Amount spent per week on fuel ($) 46.12 34.98 0 200 
Amount spent per week on tolls ($) 7.67 14.63 0 100 
Amount spent per week on public transport fares ($) 13.02 25.70 0 96 
Annual vehicle registration excl insurances ($) 679.6 464.8 0 3200 
Percentage of fuel and toll costs paid by respondent (%) 84.6  0 100 
Percentage of fuel and toll costs paid by business respondent owns 
(%) 
3.53  0 100 
Percentage of fuel and toll costs paid by another business (%) 8.88  0 100 
Number of privately registered cars in household 1.85 1.01 0 5 
Number of household business registered cars in household 0.19 0.83 0 9 
Number of other business registered cars in household 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Age of respondent 50.6 14.2 30 70 
Annual personal gross income 74,225 53,167 10,000 250,000 
Male 35.6  0 1 
No. of people in household 17 year plus 2.79 1.13 1 7 
No. of people in household 11-17 old 0.24 0.58 0 3 
No. of people in household under 11 years old 0.31 0.71 0 4 
No. of people in household  who hold a valid driver’s licence 2.53 1.06 0 4 
Survey interview time (mins) 46.2 12.37 11.4 88.5 
 
 
The average weekly cost for the status quo is $66.86 (standard deviation of $45.76 
and a maximum of $261.5); in contrast the average associated with road price (RP) 
scheme 1 is $60.60 (standard deviation of $49.86 and maximum of $446.1) and for 
road price scheme 2 it is $58.87 (standard deviation of $50.28 and maximum of 
$415.7). When we difference each of the schemes against the status quo for RP 
scheme 1, we have an average of $6.26 in favour of the status quo (with a standard 
deviation of $32.5 and range from -$208.5 to $1$133.7); and for RP scheme 2, we 
have a mean difference of $7.99 in favour of the status quo, with a standard deviation 
of $32.53 and range from -$178.2 to $166.7. This indicates that the randomisation of 
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the two RP schemes between the two non status quo alternatives has resulted in 
similar profiles of each alternative across the sample, as expected. 
 
Another way of presenting the RP schemes is to distinguish a cordon-based (CB) and 
a distance-based (DB) charging scheme. With fixed status quo kilometres, the CB 
schemes average $48.46 per week; in contrast the DB schemes average $71.0 per 
week. The latter is close to the mean status quo cost of $66.86, whereas the CB 
proposals have a significantly lower weekly cost, clearly due to reduced fuel and 
registration charges and no metropolitan wide tolls. 
 
Over the range of RP schemes investigated, we see a marked support over the status 
quo situation (i.e., 49.6 for CB and 30.6 for DB charges), with only 19.6 percent of 
the sample across four choice sets per respondent, voting for maintaining the status 
quo. Thus, over 80 percent of the time the sample would vote for a new road pricing 
scheme. This is impressive and does suggest that there is some support for pricing 
reform where changes are also made in fuel (reducing for a mean of $46.12 to $34.6), 
(reducing from a mean of $680 per year to $340 per annum) registration and toll costs 
(reducing for a mean of $7.67 per week to zero) as part of pricing reform package.  
 
The distribution of revenues generated from congestion charging is an important 
feature to gain political support, as Goodwin (1997) claimed: “discussion of road 
pricing without explicit attention to the use of revenue streams is inherently unlikely 
to be able to command a consensus in its support”. With regard to revenue 
distribution strategies, Small (1992) suggested that a package of travel allowances, tax 
reductions, and improved public transport be introduced as part of the buy in plan. 
Goodwin (1989) proposed a combination of road improvements, public transport 
improvements, and the general fund of the city or state. King et al. (2007) argued that 
distributing revenues to cities is the most appealing way to gain political support for 
congestion charges. The evidence from this study is that the sample supports 38.86 
percent of revenue raised being allocated to public transport improvements, 32.03 
percent to improving existing roads and construction of new roads, 16.06 percent to 
reducing personal income tax, and the balance of approximately 13 percent to 
compensating toll road companies for loss of revenue and payments into government 
consolidated revenue. In addition, over 91 percent of respondents indicated that they 
would support a road pricing reform trial based on a question asked in each choice set 
task: “Would you support a 3 months trial of any road pricing scheme that you have 
indicated as acceptable in order to see if it actually provides hoped for benefits to 
users and the community”.  
 
In the next section we present the formal binary choice models to identify the 
empirical relationship between acceptability of a specific RP scheme and voter 
support for road pricing reform if a referendum was to be held.  
Bivariate Probit Models 
 
A series of probit models were estimated to establish the relationship between the 
probability of voting for an RP scheme in a referendum and the probability that the 
RP scheme would be acceptable if introduced. The initial hypothesis is that support in 
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a referendum is dependent substantively on the RP scheme (as described by its 
charging regime – cordon or distance-based, the actual charging levels, and the 
revenue allocation plan) being acceptable to the self-interested individual (see 
Hensher et al. 2012). Without public acceptance ex ante, there is a very high risk of 
the referendum vote in support of a scheme failing11. 
 
Separate models were initially estimated for the voting response and the acceptability 
response; then recursive bivariate models were estimated with non-random 
parameters. The final two models (3 and 4) are recursive bivariate probits with 
random parameters for the RP scheme costs, distinguishing the current cost 
components (i.e., registration and fuel costs) (Non RP Cost) and the proposed new 
costs associated with a cordon and a distance-based charging regime (RP Costs). 
Models 3 and 4 differ by the inclusion in Model 4 of the Accept variable on the right 
hand side of the Vote model. All models are summarised in Tables 3 and 412. The set 
of explanatory variables were guided in part by the findings in Hensher et al. (2012) 
as well as extensive investigation of the rich array of data items summarised in Table 
2. It is notable that the only socioeconomic influence was personal income through an 
interaction with the number of weekly trips to and from the Central Business District, 
the location where either a cordon or a distance-based charge would be applicable.  
 
For a stated choice ‘panel’ data specification of four choice sets and three alternatives per 
respondent, as used herein, the standard errors for all bivariate probit models are corrected 
for clustering in the sample. Let V be the estimated asymptotic covariance matrix which 
ignores the clustering.  Let gij denote the first derivatives of the log likelihood with respect 
to all model parameters for observation (individual) i in cluster j, and G is the number of 
clusters.  Then, the corrected asymptotic covariance matrix is given in equation (9). 
 
 Est.Asy.Var 

     =    1 1 11 i iG n nij iji j jGG             V g g  V   (9) 
 
where V = H-1 OPG H-1 and H is the negative of the second derivatives and OPG is 
the sum of the outer products of the gradients of the terms in the log likelihood 
function. 
 
Table 3 Models of Referendum Voting and Acceptance of Road Pricing Schemes 
Sample = 2,400 observations from 200 individuals, with allowance for panel nature of data (i.e., 12 observations 
per individual). The covariance matrix is adjusted for data clustering in Models 1 and 2; t-values in brackets. 
 Independent Probit Bivariate Probit (recursive simultaneous) 
 M1 M2: Non-random parameters M3: Random parameters 
Choice Response: Voting Acceptance Voting Acceptance Voting Acceptance 
Constant -0.8853 (-11.6) -0.3231 (-2.02) -0.8988 (-12.3) -0.3875 (-2.63) -0.8647 (-8.75) -0.4556 (-4.36) 
Cordon scheme (1,0) 0.3807 (4.02) 0.3081 (3.49) 0.3857 (4.17) 0.3375 (3.82) 0.3747 (8.07) 0.2285 (4.31) 
Non RP costs (per week) -0.0069 (-5.44) -0.0080 (-4.94) -0.0072 (-6.66) -0.0080 (-5.07) -0.0087 (-7.22) -0.0105 (-8.88) 
                                                            
11 Public acceptance can be achieved ex ante through a pilot scheme such as the Stockholm pilot, which 
is a real demonstration of the merits of RP reform (see Eliasson et al. 2009). Alternatively we have to 
rely on identifying the extent of public acceptability of very specific RP schemes, ex ante, and ensure 
that the support is sufficient to obtain a positive outcome in a referendum. 
12 The alternatives defining each binary response are taken from four choice scenario screens. To 
account for the possibility that the response associated with a particular alternative is conditioned on 
the offered set of three alternatives, we included three dummy variables to represent the four choice 
scenarios. These variables were highly statistically non significant and were excluded from the final 
models, giving us confidence in the approach we have adopted. 
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RP costs (per week) -0.0122 (-7.25) -0.0113 (-5.62) -0.0116 (-7.88) -0.0111 (-8.71) -0.0200 (-10.7) -0.0227 (-14.6) 
Peak kms (per week) 0.0019 (7.56) 0.0016 (2.47) 0.0020 (7.59) 0.0016 (2.83) 0.0022 (3.52) 0.0031 (7.00) 
Off peak kms (per week) 0.0012 (5.78) 0.0011 (2.88) 0.0013 (7.12) 0.0011 (3.06) 0.0014 (3.78) 0.0014 (4.67) 
CBD trips per week*income 0.0025 (3.43) 0.0051 (3.01) 0.0019 (2.33) 0.0053 (3.07) 0.0031 91.70) 0.0075 (5.42) 
Improving public transport (0-
100) 
0.0108 (8.00) 0.0072 (4.99) 0.0108 (8.19) 0.0073 (5.06) 0.0119 (11.0) 0.0088 (7.41) 
Improving existing and 
construct new roads (0-100) 
0.0074 (4.78) 0.0080 (4.87) 0.0076 (5.07) 0.0080 (5.40) 0.0076 (6.03) 0.0082 (5.94) 
Reducing personal income tax 
(0-100) 
0.0084 (5.95) 0.0051 (3.64) 0.0082 (5.83) 0.0054 (3.94) 0.0089 (7.78) 0.0067 (5.72) 
Support trial of RP scheme 
(1,0) 
 0.3505 (2.14)  0.4341 (3.31)  0.4704 (6.71) 
No. of privately registered 
cars 
 0.0731 (1.99)  0.0558 (1.67)  0.1165 (4.54) 
Random parameter diagonal 
elements: 
      
Non RP costs ($ per week)     0.0010 (1.68) 0.0053 (11.6) 
RP costs ($ per week)     0.0227 (11.1) 0.0131 (10.3) 
Random parameter off-
diagonal elements: 
      
RP cost (V), RP cost (A)     -0.0256 (-13.9)  
NRP cost (V), RP cost (A)     -0.0044 (-5.42)  
NRP cost (V), RP cost (V)     -0.0005 (-0.76)  
NRP cost (V), RP cost (A)     0.0027 (4.30)  
NRP cost (V), RP cost (V)     -0.0021 (-4.17)  
NRP cost (V), NRP cost (A)     -0.0058 (-10.9)  
Unconditional cross-equation 
correlation (rho) 
 0.8805 (37.9) 0.919 (62.8) 
Model Fit: 
Log-likelihood (0) -1527.63 -1576.63 -3104.26 
Log-likelihood at convergence -1361.63 -1440.37 -2467.99 -2407.062 
AIC (sample adjusted) 1.143 1.210 2.076 2.033 
 
Table 4 Models of Referendum Voting and Acceptance of Road Pricing Schemes 
 
 Bivariate Probit (recursive simultaneous and endogeneity) 
 M4: 
Choice Response: Voting Acceptance 
Constant -1.811 (-5.89) -0.5445 (-4.40) 
Acceptance (1,0)  1.0238 (3.22)  
Cordon scheme (1,0) 0.3877 (7.49) 0.2086 (3.85) 
Non RP costs (per week) -0.0079 (-5.48) -0.0104 (-8.49) 
RP costs (per week) -0.0177 (-7.89) -0.0227(-13.9) 
Peak kms (per week) 0.0020 (2.98) 0.0034 (7.05) 
Off peak kms (per week) 0.0013 (3.25) 0.0013 (4.18) 
CBD trips per week*income 0.0022 (1.00) 0.0084 (5.81) 
Improving public transport (0-100) 0.0121 (10.0) 0.0089 (7.27) 
Improving existing and construct new roads (0-100) 0.0071 (5.06) 0.0082 (5.94) 
Reducing personal income tax (0-100) 0.0090 (6.97) 0.0065 (5.52) 
Support trial of RP scheme (1,0)  0.5183 (5.68) 
No. of privately registered cars  0.1467 (5.07) 
Random parameter diagonal elements:   
Non RP costs ($ per week) 0.0008 (0.88) -0.0079 (-5.48) 
RP costs ($ per week) 0.0237 (9.93) -0.0227 (-13.9) 
Random parameter off-diagonal elements:   
RP cost (V), RP cost (A) -0.0270 (-13.4) 
NRP cost (V), RP cost (A) -0.0055 (-6.07) 
NRP cost (V), RP cost (V) -0.0004 (-0.53) 
NRP cost (V), RP cost (A) 0.0028 (4.47) 
NRP cost (V), RP cost (V) -0.0031 (-5.45) 
NRP cost (V), NRP cost (A) 0.0084 (13.5) 
Unconditional cross-equation correlation (rho) 0.6684 (6.67) 
Model Fit: 
Log-likelihood (0) -3104.26 
Log-likelihood at convergence -2402.12 
AIC (sample adjusted) 2.030 
 
There is a noticeable improvement in the overall goodness-of fit in moving from the 
independent probit Model 1 (-2,802.0) to the bivariate probit Model 2 (-2,477.99) 
with non-random parameters. When we add in random parameters for the two cost 
variables, the log-likelihood for Model 3 improves even further (-2407.062); with an 
additional improvement in Model 4 (-2402.12) when Accept is introduced as a right 
hand side endogenous variable in the Vote model. The endogeneity of Accept is 
statistically significant, suggesting that the acceptability of a RP scheme is a positive 
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and important influence on the probability of voting for the scheme in a referendum, 
after allowing for a set of exogenous effects. The mean elasticity estimates discussed 
later reaffirm the strength of the influence. 
 
The estimate of the correlated disturbances (rho) is 0.919 in Model 3 with a standard 
error of 0.01465, producing a very high t-ratio. The Wald statistic for the test of the 
hypothesis that rho equals zero is (0.919/0.01465)2 = 3,943.84. For a single 
restriction, the critical value from the chi-squared table is 3.84; hence the hypothesis 
is well and truly rejected. Model 3 does not include the endogenous effect of 
acceptance on referendum voting. When we allow for the endogeneity of acceptance 
(Model 4), rho declines, as expected, but it is still relatively correlated at 0. 6684 with 
a t-ratio of 6.67, again rejecting the null hypothesis on the Wald test. The non-random 
parameters bivariate probit Model 2 has a correlated disturbance of 0.8805, 
statistically significant but slightly lower than the correlation in Model with two 
random parameters, which is interesting of itself and suggests that the inclusion of 
preference heterogeneity appears to induce some amount of increased association 
between the unobserved influences. It is not clear why this is the case. 
 
The random parameters in Models 3 and 4 have unbounded normal distributions, and 
have been specified such that the correlation of the random parameters (through the 
cholesky decomposition) has been allowed for in the derivation of the standard 
deviations of the distributions. Figures 3 and 4 are presented to highlight the extent to 
which the distribution of the conditional means of the two price attributes are in the 
negative domain for the 95 percent probability intervals. They show that the 
conditional mean for each sampled individual is predominantly below zero, but there 
are some positive estimates as well. Given that the assumed distribution is unbounded, 
some amount of sign change can be expected13.  
 
  
                                                            
13 We did assess a lognormal, a constrained triangular and a constrained normal, but the unconstrained 
normal gave the best fit (converged well), and identified very few non-negative values in the 
distribution as confirmed by Figures 3 and 4. 
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Figure 3 Confidence Limits on conditional means of random parameters in Model 3 
 
 
Figure 4 Confidence Limits on conditional means of random parameters in Model 4 
Looking at the non-random parameter variables, we find strong statistical 
significance. The interaction between the number of weekly CBD trips and personal 
income is positive, suggesting, all other influences remaining constant, that 
individuals who have higher personal incomes and have high travel activity to and 
from the CBD, tend to support RP reforms to a greater extent, and would have a 
higher probability of voting for them, presumably because they can afford this, and 
see the time benefits associated with reductions in traffic congestion14. The number of 
                                                            
14 The time benefits were not directly communicated. There are, however, clues as to how respondents 
perceive the benefits beyond monetary cost implications, notably potential travel time benefits. The 
response to how effective the scheme is in reducing congestion must have some link to a view of 
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privately registered cars has a positive and statistically significant influence on the 
probability of accepting a scheme; however when we included all cars available to a 
household (i.e., include household-business registered and employer provide cars), the 
number of vehicle was not statistically significant. This may be due to the fact that the 
non-privately registered cars are subject to generous tax concessions and/or fully 
compensated expenses for vehicle kilometres travelled and may be ambivalent to the 
reforms.  
 
There is positive evidence that individuals who support a trial (91.8 percent of the 
sample) have a greater probability of accepting a scheme which converts to an 
increased probability of voting in favour in a referendum. Finally, the cordon-based 
scheme dummy variable suggests that a CBD cordon-based charging scheme is 
perceived to be more acceptable, and will engender a higher probability of a vote 
compared to a distance-based charging scheme. This is not surprising, supporting the 
finding in Hensher et al. (2012), given that it does not impact on kilometres 
undertaken outside of the CBD, which is the great majority of daily kilometres. 
 
Regardless of the merits of each reform package in terms of the impact on levels of 
traffic congestion, there are very strong arguments opposing any reform if it 
discriminates between individuals on vertical equity grounds (i.e., the impact on 
individuals in different personal income groups). There is a large literature on the 
topic (e.g., Ison 1998, King et al., 2007, Levinson 2010 and Peters and Kramer 2012). 
Despite the recognition that revenue allocation 15  can be a major lever to gain 
community support for road pricing reform, as shown by statistically significant 
parameters for the three sources of funding hypothecation (i.e., public transport, roads 
and reductions in personal income tax), there is also a view and evidence that revenue 
redistribution cannot resolve all equity and fairness concerns. Initial travel patterns 
also matter (Eliasson and Mattsson 2006), especially the concern that individuals 
undertaking most of the trips will be the ones most affected by any change, even if the 
impact is higher levels of time benefits. Defining trip exposure in terms of weekly 
peak and off-peak kilometres, we obtain positive and statistically significant 
parameter estimates for both Accept and Vote models. What this suggests is that car 
users who are more exposed to the road network through higher kilometres are more 
accepting of RP reform and more likely to vote for reforms compared to light users of 
the network. This has important implications for the often made claim that it is not 
fair to impose such charges on those who use the network more intensively than those 
who travel fewer kilometres. This appears, in general, not to be the situation. The 
strength of the level of exposure is given in the elasticity estimates below. 
 
The key elasticity results are summarised in Table 5 and relate to the percentage 
change in the probability of an RP scheme being acceptable and that you would vote 
for it in a referendum (i.e., E[y1|y2=1]) with respect to a percentage change in the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
improved travel time. It was mentioned up front that these road pricing reforms are designed to reduce 
traffic congestion. 
15 Manville and King (2012) also raise the concern about credible commitment from government in 
using the revenue in line with community supports for reform. Hensher et al. (2012) found only 22 
percent of the sample had confidence that government would allocate revenue the way they would like 
it allocated. 
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variable of interest16. It is very informative to compare the elasticities associated with 
Vote and Accept in separate probit models with the bivariate probit models. In 
general, the direct price elasticities are lower (i.e., less sensitivity) under joint 
estimation of Vote and Accept in models 2 and 3 compared to model 1 where the 
jointness is captured through correlated disturbances but with no right hand side 
endogeneity. When Accept is included as an endogenous influence on Vote in model 
4, the direct elasticity estimate seems to move closer to the average of the independent 
probit estimates of model 1, being lower than the Vote mean estimate but higher than 
the Accept mean estimate. 
 
Table 5 Summary of Direct Elasticities (t-values in brackets) 
 Independent Probit Bivariate Probit 
 M1: M2: Non-
random 
parameters 
M3: Random 
parameters 
M4: Random 
parameters with 
Endogeneity 
 Voting Acceptance Voting (=1) Acceptance (=1) 
(compared to V1A0, V0A1, V0A0) 
Non RP costs ($ per week) -0.432 (4.95) -0.267 (4.54) -0.182 (2.75) -0.226 (2.82) -0.327 (3.48) 
RP costs ($ per week) -0.234 (5.38) -0.126 (4.00) -0.097 (3.00) -0.1301(2.10) -0.190 (2.77) 
Peak kms (per week) 0.155 (7.46) 0.070 (2.74) 0.090 (4.23) 0.058(1.26) 0.089 (1.45) 
Off peak kms (per week) 0.199 (5.75) 0.096 (3.07) 0.121 (3.80) 0.121 (2.22) 0.180 (2.36) 
Improving public transport (0-100) 0.131 (10.7) 0.048 (6.46) 0.082 (8.98) 0.092 (8.39) 0.123 (5.97) 
Improving existing and construct new roads (0-100) 0.190 (5.11) 0.098 (5.46) 0.095 (3.12) 0.101 (3.300 0.136 (3.17 
Reducing personal income tax (0-100) 0.116 (7.42) 0.038 (4.32) 0.072 (5.91) 0.079 (5.92) 0.107 (5.07) 
 
A particularly important finding is for road pricing costs per week (RPCost). We have 
-0.130 for Model 3 and -0.190 for Model 4, whereas the elasticities associated with 
Vote and Accept alone (Model 1) are respectively -0.234 and -0.126. This suggests in 
Model 1 that if one focussed only on acceptability, we obtain a much lower mean 
direct elasticity than if one just focuses on referendum voting. What this indicates is 
that a scheme has to be acceptable for it to receive a higher probability of voting for it 
in a referendum, given the scheme costs and other contextual influences. This 
reinforces the well argued views that public acceptability is crucial to obtain increased 
buy in, and a resultant higher probability of a yes vote in a referendum (Goodwin 
1989, Hensher et al. 2012, Schade et al. 2007, Ubbels and Verhoef 2006).  
 
Without exception, all mean estimates of direct elasticities are inelastic and below 
|0.5|. The lower direct elasticies for RP Cost compared to Non RP Cost reflect the 
relative cost of each source, which indicates that any additional costs, if existing costs 
remain, are quite a lot less than 50 percent of the total cost under a proposed scheme. 
The elasticities associated with current trip exposure in terms of peak and off peak 
kilometres are very informative, suggesting for Model 4, our preferred model, that a 
25 percent increase in weekly peak and off peak kilometres (chosen as a reasonable 
change, given average peak and off peak kilometres per week are 70.68 and 145.9 
kilometres respectively) results respectively in a 2.25 and 4.5 percent increase in the 
                                                            
16 We have no basis of calibrating when the reform schemes are not in existence in real markets. 
Furthermore, there is only one market choice observed, and hence there is no revealed preference 
model. The evidence in Li and Hensher (2012), which includes a review of revealed preference 
evidence, focuses on changes in travel. It is not possible to contrast our evidence with other studies 
because the focus is on voting and acceptance elasticities which, as far as I am aware, do not exist in 
other studies.  
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joint probability of accepting and voting for a proposed RP scheme. The revenue 
allocation preferences are also informative; all other influences being held constant, if 
all the RP scheme funds raised were hypothecated to public transport (compared to 
none), the percentage change in the probability of accepting and voting for a specific 
RP scheme would increase by 12.3 percentage points; likewise the equivalent impact 
if all funds were allocated to improvements in existing and new roads is 13.6 percent, 
with a 10.7 percent increase if all monies were hypothecated to reduced personal 
income taxes. Given the ‘closeness’ of these percentage changes, any mix of revenue 
allocation that is hypothecated as a mixture of the three revenue allocation categories, 
would result in an increase in the percentage change in the probability of accepting 
and voting for a specific RP scheme of around 11 percent. 
 
Although the evidence above is illuminating in identifying the potential influence of 
RP reform pricing, trip activity and revenue allocation, it is even more informative to 
establish the extent to which a particular scheme might get over the line in a 
referendum. We have assessed weekly outlays varying from $1 to $40 in $1 
increments, equivalent to a CBD cordon-based daily entry fee of $0.2 to $8, and 
equivalent to a charge of 0.5 to 20 cents per kilometre under a distance-based 
charging regime for an average weekly total of 200 kilometres. 
 
The model is set up in such a way that the assessment of a CBD cordon-based charge 
compared to a system wide distance-based charging scheme has to account for the 
role of the cordon-based dummy variable in the model. What we find is that if we can 
contain the CBD cordon charge to a maximum of $5 for entry per day and at any time 
of a weekday between 7am and 6pm, or a distance-based charge of $10c/km, then the 
likelihood of a scheme being voted for with an outcome greater than 50 per cent is 
encouraging (See Figures 5a and 5b). This is based on all of the revenue hypothecated 
to public transport, which will, given the evidence herein and in Hensher et al. (2012), 
improve the stakes. 
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Figure 5 Impact of Cordon-Based (a) and Distance-Based (b) Charging per week given all revenue is 
hypothecated to Public Transport17  
Notes: ARPC = road pricing cost per week, Avg.P.ER – average partial effect, PT100 = all revenue is allocated to 
public transport.  
 
If we ignored the allocation of revenue, the probability of more than 50 percent of 
residents voting for a CBD cordon-based or a distance-based charging scheme is 
likely to fail; the cordon-based charge of $5 would only obtain 34 percent support and 
the distance-based charge of 10c/km would result in 32 percent support. 
Conclusions 
 
This paper has investigated the relationship between the perceived acceptability of a 
specific road pricing scheme and voting intentions if such a scheme were subject to a 
referendum. Although it is generally accepted that public acceptability is an essential 
pre-condition for a supporting vote, the evidence to date has been predominantly 
descriptive. We have not had evidence obtained from a more formal modelling 
assessment of the role that perceived acceptability has after accounting for the specific 
scheme specification (in terms of regime, price level and revenue allocation plan), as 
well as relevant contextual influences such as exposure to the road network 
(expressed through peak and off peak weekly kilometres), and personal income. 
 
The empirical evidence suggests that there is an important ‘residual’ acceptability 
element on voting preferences after controlling for the influences in the previous 
paragraph, as well as correlated disturbances on unobserved effects. We have 
presented evidence to show how sensitive the estimates of direct elasticities between 
the four models are as we move from independent probit models of Vote and Accept 
to interdependent bivariate probit models with correlated disturbances, through to a 
model that includes the endogeneity of Accept on Vote.  
 
The findings have value in giving some direction to the degree of acceptability and 
support for road pricing reform. The evidence suggests that high kilometre car users 
are more accepting of road pricing reform (despite incurring higher costs under a 
distance-based charging regime), presumably because they see greater time benefits 
associated with their greater presence in peak period traffic congestion, and hence are 
more likely to vote for reforms, compared to light users of the network. This has 
important implications for the often made claim that it is not fair to impose such 
charges on those who use the network more intensively than those who travel fewer 
kilometres. This appears, in general, not to be the situation. The strong perceived 
support for a restructuring of the package of costs of car ownership (i.e., registration) 
and use, as shown by over 80 percent of respondents supporting a position that the 
range of road pricing schemes assessed will be effective in reducing traffic 
congestion, to varying degrees, offers encouraging signs of community interest (at 
least) in progressing options for a more detailed package of road pricing initiatives.  
                                                            
17 The vertical axis is the first derivative of the probability of voting with respect to either the cordon-
based charge or the distance-based charge, given a public transport revenue allocation of 100% 
reported as the mean over draws. The black line traces the average value of the function with the 
specific ARPC defined. 
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Hensher and Mulley (2012) have developed one such reform plan centred on reducing 
annual registration fees in the presence on a peak period distance-based charge; with 
the conditions that at least, on average, motorists will not worse off financially 
(although they subsequently gain time benefits), and that Treasury is at least revenue 
neutral, and possibly better off, so as to reinvest some of the additional funds back 
into roads and improved public transport. 
 
The models presented above do not allow for heteroscedastic error variances, which 
can be made a function of sources of systematic variation such as income. An 
interesting extension is to test for the effect of income on support for the road pricing 
schemes, given that those with higher incomes and more exposure may be more 
supportive. 
 
The evidence presented in this paper is based on an investigation in one large 
metropolitan area, which has been exposed to tolling on specific roads for at least 15 
years, and hence there are contextual influences at play. The existing tolled roads 
have delivered much needed infrastructure and time savings. This may not be the case 
in other metropolitan settings; nevertheless the approach and evidence provides a new 
benchmark on ex ante support for studies in other geographical jurisdictions to build 
on. 
 
The choice experiment is state of the art in design, but it may be seen by some readers 
as complex. While we recognise that there are varying views on acceptable detail in 
choice experiments, the fundamental driver of a relevant choice experiment is that it is 
comprehensive and comprehendable. This has been achieved in this study through the 
extensive period of in depth interviews and piloting of the instrument, and the training 
of highly experienced interviewers whose task is to support but not influence the 
respondents as they work through the instrument. The interviewers have, in this study, 
provided the framework within which we have minimised the risk of instrument bias 
due to the risk of confusion and ambiguity in what the task is. 
 
In ongoing research we are investigating the role that attribute processing strategies 
might play in influencing the way each respondent processes each attribute in arriving 
at the relevant set of attributes that contribute to the voting choice and acceptability of 
an alternative. A growing number of attribute processing rules are presented in 
Hensher (2013). 
 
A practical message from this study is the value in choice experiments of not only 
seeking responses on the preferred alternative (or a ranking of the alternatives), but of 
including response questions pertinent to each alternative so that empirical inquiries 
such as the one in this paper can be undertaken. 
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